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HUMANIZING THE ATOM: ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY
STEPHEN GOROVE

T E discovery of the means of releasing atomic energy marked
the beginning of a new era in the history of civilization. Hiroshima
gave the cofip de grdce to the idea that we might return to our past
patterns of life, and that we had just turned a corner. By man's
miraculous inventiveness, a new age was ushered in with all its
frightening potentialities, challenging promises, and unparalleled expectations. The world, indeed, stood on the threshold of the Atomic
Age.
Born of military necessity, the new and complex science of the
atom has had to proceed cautiously from the laboratory of scientists
to the drawing board of engineers to accomplish its first peaceful
application. Recent progress, however, seems to have brought the
myriad uses of the atom, as a major source of energy, somewhat
closer to reality. Agricultural, industrial, and medical applications
have become more and more promising. It can now reasonably be
expected that the day is not too far when many countries will be in
a position to produce atomic power for large-scale civilian uses, to
turn the wheels of factories, to serve transportation and irrigation
needs, to bring light to countless homes.'
While many problems remain to be solved in connection with the
Sm-

r GoRoV

is a Research Associate, Columbia University and Professor of

Law, New York Law School.

1 Cf. President Eisenhower's Message of October 24, 1955 to the Conference on
Atomic Energy Industry at New York City, 33 Dept. of State Bul. 787 (Nov. 14, 1955).
In many countries the development and use of atomic energy has become a matter
of great urgency in view of the dwindling conventional resources for power. Cf. 2 U. N.
Rev. 1 (July 1955).
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peaceful uses of nuclear energy,' it appears that an encouraging start
has been made on the long and challenging road of atomic growth
and experimentation.
It was in this climate of hopes and expectations that the United
States, as a leading nation in atomic resources and skill, guided by
altruistic motives, as well as by enlightened self-interest, has decided
as a matter of national policy to make the benefits of technological
findings resulting from its large expenditures on nuclear energy available to the rest of the world.3 By placing training and research tools
in the hands of nations which do not possess them, by training their
technicians in American schools and laboratories, and by sharing its
great store of technical knowledge, the United States has taken the
position that knowledge of the atom cannot be claimed as a monopoly
of a few large countries but must serve the interests of the world at
large.
In keeping with the traditionally lofty principles of American
foreign policy, President Eisenhower, addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953, pledged the United
States "to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma", and for this end,
he proposed international cooperation in developing the peaceful uses
4
of the atom through the establishment of an international agency.
In urging the creation of such an agency, President Eisenhower had
in mind two major purposes. The first was to channel nuclear materials from national stores into a new international agency so as "to
diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles." 5 The second purpose was to devise methods whereby fissionable materials would be internationally allocated "to serve only the
peaceful pursuits of mankind."'
The President's proposal met with overwhelmingly favorable re2 There are still great obstacles to be overcome. Skilled labor is in serious shortage.
Large capital resources are needed and the best technology has to be worked out. See
35 Dept. of State Bul. 928 (December 10, 1956).
3 For U.S. programs accelerating the development of nuclear power abroad, See

33 ibid. 661 (Oct. 24, 1955) ; 35 ibid. 511 (Oct. 1, 1956).
4 U. N. General Assembly, Off. Rec. 8th Sess., 470th Plenary Meeting, December
8, 1953, pp. 452-456.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. It was not intended that the proposed agency should take over national
programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the Soviet
Union, or the work of regional groups such as CERN, Conseil Europfen pour ]a recherche nucl6aire, of the efforts of UNESCO to extend the availability and use of radioisotopes in scientific problems. See 32 Dept. of State Bul. 693 (Ap. 25, 1955).
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sponse.1 It was hoped that the agency would play a major role in
collecting and disseminating information on atomic matters, in coordinating national training programs, and in making available power
and research reactors, technology and fuel throughout the world.
There seemed to be only one cloud darkening the looming horizon of international atomic cooperation: the attitude of the Soviet
Union, ranging from passive non-committal to active opposition to
the sharing of any part of its nuclear resources with an international
agency. It was the view of the Soviet Government that it could
not enter into negotiations on this subject matter except if the conferees would, at the same time, consider the unconditional renunciation of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.8
While Washington was anxious to secure Moscow's cooperation
especially in view of the latter's past accomplishments and expected
contributions to the proposed agency, it felt that an unconditional
pledge renouncing the use of atomic weapons would accomplish little,
unless it was also accompanied by effective enforcement measures.
Furthermore, Washington did not intend to have the objective defeated by long delays and excessively technical discussions. It considered that as too high a price to pay for Soviet cooperation.9
Thus the United States decided to by-pass Soviet stalling, and
gave the green light to the implementation of its plan concerning the
formation of an international agency. On September 23, 1954, it
requested the inclusion in the agenda of the Ninth Session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations an item on international
cooperation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy.1" It
was Washington's hope that the United Nations would consider the
latest potential implications for peace and public welfare which could
emerge from an international agency devoted to the multiple peaceful uses of fissionable materials.
Discussions in the United Nations appeared now to have taken
7 31 Ibid. 473 (Oct. 4, 1954) ; 32 Ibid. 272 (Feb. 14, 1955).
8 31 Ibid. 365 (Sep. 13, 1954) ; 32 Ibid. 1028 (June 27, 1955).
9 In President Eisenhower's address, the Soviet Union was mentioned as one of

the nations "principally involved." See note 4 above, p. 454.
10 For text of the letter of September 23, 1954 from the Chairman of the United
States delegation to the General Assembly, see U. N. Doc. A/2734 (1954).
The item was considered in the First Committee from November 3 to November

23, 1954. See U. N. General Assembly, 9th Sess., 1st Comm., 707th to 725th Meetings
(1954).
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a favorable turn. The Soviet Union no longer made its participation
contingent on the prohibition of atomic weapons,"1 and, on December 4, 1954, the General Assembly unanimously 2 adopted a Resolution"3 urging the establishment of an international agency. 14 The Assembly expressed the hope that the proposed agency would be brought
into relationship with the United Nations."5 It also suggested that
Members of the United Nations be informed of the progress of negotiations and that the views of interested Members be fully considered. 16 In pursuance of this Resolution, the eight States' 7 which had
been conferring on the formation of the agency prepared and circulated a Draft Statute" which reflected not only their views but many

11

Docs. A/C. I/L. 106 & Rev. 1.

12 The Soviet representative stated that support of the Resolution signified his

Government's fidelity to the principles of international cooperation in the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes but did not imply approval of the provisions which in
its view restricted or hindered such cooperation. For details, see U. N. Yearbook 1-9
(1954).
13 Res. 810 (IX); Doc. A/2805.
14 Before the adoption of the Resolution much discussion took place and a series
of amendments were introduced to the original American sponsored draft by the Soviet
Union, India and Lebanon. While the amendments were either rejected or withdrawn,
some of the views expressed therein were incorporated in the final Resolution. For
details, see does. A/L. 179; A/C. L/L. 105 & Rev. 1 and for the amendments, see docs.
A/C. i/L. 106 & Rev. 1; A/C. I/L. 107; A/C. 1/L. 108.
15 The Soviet Union was opposed to the view advanced by the American delegate
that the proposed agency should negotiate a relationship with the United Nations
similar to those of the Specialized Agencies. It felt that the new agency ought to have
the same status vis-a-vis the Security Council as the Atomic Energy Commission had
had, that is, it should be accountable to the Security Council in matters of peace and
security. The Resolution, however, left open the question of the specific relationship
of the new agency to the United Nations. See General Assembly, 9th Sess., Off. Rec.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 67, doc. A/C. I/L. 106/Rev. 1.
In response to a request made by the First Committee of the General Assembly,
the Secretary General made available to Members a paper entitled: "Summary of
internal Secretariat studies of constitutional questions relating to agencies within the
framework of the United Nations." The report provided a factual review of precedents
concerning the establishment of the Specialized Agencies and their relationship with
the United Nations, and stressed the fact that while precedents were useful they
could not be regarded as conclusive or binding and other solutions might have to be
found in a new situation. See General Assembly, 9th Sess., doc. A/C. 1/758.
16 An amendment introduced by India provided that states already engaged in
consultations would seek to consult other states which had shown interest in the
creation of the new agency and that the views of the states so consulted should be fully
considered. The amendment was subsequently withdrawn. See doc. A/C. I/L. 107.
17 The eight negotiating States were: the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal and the Union of South Africa.
Is For text of the Draft Statute, a copy of which was given to the Soviet Union on
July 29, 1955, and copies of which were distributed by the United States on August
22, 1955 to all other members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies,
see 33 Dept. of State Bul. 666-672 (Oct. 24, 1955) ; cf. ibid. at 662.
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of the suggestions made during the discussions in the United
Nations. 19
When the Draft was placed before the First Committee of the
Tenth General Assembly, the United States and other sponsoring
nations felt that the Assembly was not the most effective or appropriate place to consider in detail a long and complex technical document." They suggested, instead, a Working Level Meeting2 ' in which,
in addition to the eight sponsoring nations, Brazil, Czechoslovakia,
India, and the Soviet Union would also participate. 22 On December 3, 1955, the Tenth Assembly after lengthy debates unanimously2 3
approved this plan,24 recommending that the negotiating Governments
take into account the views expressed in the Assembly, as well as the
comments transmitted directly by Governments. 25 The Assembly
also welcomed the intention of the sponsoring nations to invite all
Members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies to take
part in a conference on the final text of the agency. 26
19 The United States emphasized that it did not consider the Draft as a "final
document" but welcomed "constructive suggestions." For details, see General Assembly,
10th Sess., Off. Rec., First Committee, 757th Mtg., p. 6 (1955).
20 Ibid., 758th Mtg., p. 10 (1955).
21 Invitations to the meeting were sent out by the Government of the United
States on October 21, 1955, see Press Release 617 of the same date, 33 Dept. of State
Bul. 798 (Nov. 14, 1955).
22 The United States felt that to expand the twelve-nation Working Level Group
still further as suggested by Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and the Philippines, would in all
probability lower its effectiveness. See ibid. at 803.
23 By 53 votes to none with 8 abstentions, see General Assembly, Tenth Sess.,
Off. Rec., 550th Plenary Mtg., p. 391 (1955).
24 Res. 912 X of Dec. 3, 1955; doc. A/Res/334. For text of the original AngloAmerican Draft Resolution, with which Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Union
of South Africa, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Argentina, Norway, Peru, Denmark,
Iceland and Sweden associated themselves as co-sponsors, see docs. A/C. I/L. 129 and
Add. 1; for later amendments introduced by India, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan
and the Philippines, see docs. A/C. i/L. 130, A/C. 1/L. 131 & Add. 1, A/C. 1/L. 132
& Rev. 1, A/C. 1/L. 133; A/C. 1/L. 134, A/C. 1/L. 135, A/C. I/L. 136.
In the Resolution, the Assembly also suggested that the agency when established
consider the publication of an international periodical devoted to the peaceful uses
of atomic energy.
25 A similar recommendation was advanced in an earlier draft by India and was
subsequently supported by Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Syria and Yugoslavia, see docs.
A/C. 1/L. 131 & Add. 1.
26 A sampling of the- views and the various draft resolutions submitted during the
debates indicates that the Soviet bloc nations invoked the principle of "universality"
and pressed for the participation of Communist China against a strong opposition led
by the United States. The Soviet Union also repeated its demand for the unconditional
prohibition of atomic weapons and proposed the agency's close integration into the
United Nations system so that if some question concerning the security of any state
arose in connection with the work of the new agency, the necessary decision would
be taken by the Security Council. In advancing the latter viewpoint, it seemed that the
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The Governments participating in the Working Level Meeting
deliberated in Washington throughout the earlier part of 1956,27
and on June 28 of the same year issued a joint Report containing
2 a revised version
inter aliWa
of the Draft Statute.2 9 The joint Report
was then included in the invitations3 0 sent by the United States, to
Members of the United Nations"' and of the Specialized Agencies82
Soviet Union's position came closer to that of the United States, namely that under
the Charter, the Security Council could always act if it considered that the agency's
activities would endanger international peace and security. See General Assembly, 10th
Sess., First Committee, 759th-764th Meetings (Oct. 11-18, 1955); cf. docs. A/C. I/L. 132
& Rev. 1, A/C. i/L. 136; cf. also notes 8 and 15 above.
In addition, many other nations, especially the underdeveloped countries invoked
the principle of "equality" opposing any colonial exploitation in connection with the
development of the peaceful uses of the atom. See General Assembly, lath Sess., First
Committee, 761st, 765th Mtgs. (Oct. 13, 19, 1955).
27 The twelve-nation Working Level Group, composed of Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, the Union of South Africa,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, held meetings from
Feb. 27-June 28, 1956. The Group established three committees: first, a Scientific
Committee to provide the meeting with appropriate technical definitions and to review
the Draft Statute in its entirety for scientific accuracy; second, a Drafting Committee
to review the articles and proposed changes both as to language and place of order of
the language, and last, a Committee of the Whole to work out detailed arrangements
for an international conference on the Draft Statute. The initial three sessions of the
Group were devoted to a first reading of the Draft Statute of August 22, 1955, and
the delegates indicated, those articles on which they wished to propose amendments.
During its next fifteen sessions, the Group reviewed each article of the Draft, together
with the proposed amendments, taking into account the comments advanced during the
proceedings of the Tenth General Assembly as well as those of the 39 States which
submitted observations on the Draft in response to a request made by the initial
negotiators in August 1955 to all States Members of the United Nations and its
Specialized Agencies. See Report of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Feb. 27-June 28, 1956), Washington, 1956.
See also 34 Dept. of State Bul. 729 (Ap. 30, 1956) ; 35 ibid. 162-4 (July 23, 1956).
28 The Report included the origin and development of the Working Level Meeting
(Annex I), the participants (Annex II), the text of the revised Draft Statute (Annex
III), the reservations (Annex IV), the agenda (Annex V), and the rules of procedure
for the proposed conference (Annex VI). See Report of the Working Level Meeting
(Feb. 27-June 28, 1956), Washington, 1956; 35 Dept. of State Bul. 162-4 (July 23,
1956).
29 Text of the revised Draft Statute which was approved ad referendum by the
twelve-nation Working Level Group on April 18, 1956, may also be found in 34 Dept.
of State Bul. 852-9 (May 21, 1956). While Australia, Czechoslovakia, India and the
Soviet Union reserved their positions on certain details, all delegations voted in favor
of the revised Draft Statute as a whole. See 34 ibid. 729 (April 30, 1956) ; 35 ibid. 163
(July 23, 1956).
30 In the invitations attention was drawn in particular to the procedural rules
governing the composition of delegations and submission of credentials; the regulations concerning submission and consideration of amendments; and the expenses of the
Conference and of the participating delegations. See 35 ibid. 162-4 (July 23, 1956).
31 At the Working Level Meeting, the Soviet Union objected categorically to the
sending of an invitation to the Republic of China and demanded that an invitation be
sent to the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union further considered that similar
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for the purpose of discussing, approving and opening for signature

the proposed statute at a special conference in New York.
The Conference convened in September 1956.

Of the eighty-

seven invited Governments, eighty-one took part in the historic meeting. Despite some concern that heavy amending might tend to unbalance the carefully conceived document, 33 the final Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met the full approval
of the sponsoring nations.

The twenty-three article Statute,3 4 which was open for signa35

ture

on October 26, 1956 by all States Members of the United

Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies,36 will go into effect
when eighteen States have deposited 37 their instruments of ratification38 with the depositary Government, 9 provided the eighteen ininvitations be sent to North Korea and Northern Viet-Nam. The representatives of
Czechoslovakia and India made statements to the same effect. The majority, however,
including the United States, favored the sending of invitations to the Republic of China,
South Korea and Southern Viet-Nam. See Report of the Working Level Meeting (Feb.
27-June 28, 1956), Washington, 1956; 35 Dept. of State Bul. 162 (July 23, 1956).
32 In addition to the Member States, the Specialized Agencies themselves were invited to designate a representative to attend the proposed conference in an observer
capacity. Observers were sent by ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, the International
Bank, WHO, and the World Meteorological Organization. See Conference on the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Credentials Report by the Secretary General, doc. IAEA/CS/7; 35 Dept. of State Bul. 163 (July 23, 1956).
33 Sixty-eight amendments to the revised Draft Statute were proposed during the
course of debate. See 3 U. N. Rev. 37 (Jan. 1957).
34 The Statute was done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
languages, each being equally authentic. See Art. XXHI of the Statute; see also (doc.
IAEA/CS/OR. 35) p. 91.
35 For list of signatories as of October 26, 1956, see Proceedings of the Conference
on the Statute of the IAEA (doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 40) pp. 11-15.
36 It remained open for signature by those States for a period of ninety days, see
Art. XXI, par. A.
A Hungarian proposal to delete the phrase "by all States Members of the United
Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies" was defeated see docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
XXI/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 35, p. 82.
37 In accordance with their "respective constitutional processes", see Art. XXI,
par. D.
38 Instruments of ratification, and instruments of acceptance in case of states admitted to membership by the Agency which are deposited after the entry into force of
the Statute, take effect on the date of their receipt, see Art. XXI, par. E.
39 By Art. XXI, par. C, -the Government of the United States has been designated
as depositary Government. It is the statutory duty of the depositary Government to
inform all signatories to the Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification as well
as the date of entry into force of the Statute. The depositary Government is also
obligated to inform promptly all signatories and members of the dates on which States
subsequently become parties thereto. Finally, the depositary Government is bound
to register the Statute with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter
and to transmit duly certified copies to the other signatories and to the States admitted
to membership. See Arts. XXI, par. F; XXII, par. A; and XXIII. Cf. Doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 35, pp. 86-7, 91.
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clude at least three from among Canada, France, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 40 For the interim period
a Preparatory Commission was set up41 to "make studies, reports, and
recommendations
on "subjects of concern to the Agency requiring immediate attention"48 and to "make preparations" 44 for the first
General Conference of the Agency 45 and to "designate" members of
its first governing Board. 46
The new Agency grew out of certain fundamental considerations
which were voiced several times by the United States and were shared
by many other nations. Underlying the creation of the IAEA was the
expectation that cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom would
serve "as a bridge and an avenue to peace. 41 A second major reason
for promoting the peaceful development of nuclear power through an
40 Art. XXI, par. E. The Annex to the Statute went into effect on October 26,
1956, see Art. XXI, pars. E and G; cf. Doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 35, pp. 81-2.
41 The Preparatory Commission, composed of one representative each of Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, the Union of South
Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, and one representative each of six other States, namely Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan
and Peru, chosen by the Conference, came into existence on October 26, 1956 and will
remain in existence until the Statute goes into effect and therafter until the General
Conference of the Agency has convened and its Board of Governors has been selected.
See Annex I, par. A to the Statute; see also doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 39, p. 61; Art. VI, subpars. A-1 and A-2, and par. B.
An amendment proposed by the Soviet Union to enlarge the composition of the
Preparatory Commission was subsequently withdrawn, see doc. IAEA/CS/Annex
I/Amend. 1; cf. also does. IAEA/CS/Annex I/Amends. 2 and 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 37,
pp. 118-20.
42 These are made for the first session of the General Conference and for the first
meeting of the Board of Governors. See Annex I, sub-par. C-5.
43 These subjects include: the financing of the Agency, the programs and budget
for the first year, technical problems relevant to advance planning of Agency operations, establishment of a permanent staff, and location of the permanent headquarters
of the Agency. In regard to the last item, it is the duty of the Preparatory Commission
to make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning
the provisions of the headquarters agreement defining the status of the Agency and the
rights and obligations which will exist between the Agency and the host Government.
See Annex I, sub-pars. C-5, and C-6.
On selecting Vienna for the permanent headquarters of the Agency, see doe.
IAEA/CS/9 and Amend. 1; cf. also 3 U. N. Rev. 37 (Jan. 1997).
44 Such arrangements include the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft
rules of procedure. See Annex I, sub-par. C-3.
45 The session is to be held "as soon as possible" after the entry into force of
the Statute. Ibid.
46 Annex I, sub-par. C-4. Additional functions of the Preparatory Commission
include: the election of its own officers, adoption of its own rules of procedure, appointment of an executive secretary and staff, entering into negotiations with the United
Nations to prepare a draft agreement concerning the relationship of the Agency to the
United Nations, and recommendations in regard to the Agency's relationship to other
international organizations. See Annex I, sub-pars. C-1, C-2, and C-7; Art. XVI.
47 35 Dept. of State Bul. 924 (Dec. 10, 1956).
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international agency was to ensure the safeguarded expansion of
peaceful atomic energy activities throughout the world. The duality
in the use of nuclear power, both for peaceful and military purposes,
has led to the conclusion that it is better "to assist in the development of peaceful atomic industries, with proper safeguards," rather
than let atomic energy "develop in a haphazard way", leading to sus48
picion and the building of military stockpiles in many countries.
A third reason was the belief that the testing of international controls
over the use of fissionable materials supplied for peaceful purposes,
would provide a useful experiment and might well turn out to be the
first step toward a system of international inspection and control.
Finally, it was hoped that by an increase of the power resources
available to nations which are confronted with power shortages, the
economic causes of war could be diminished.49
Complementing this background of long-range expectations, there
was an undercurrent of enthusiasm generated by the common awareness of the importance of the Agency for all countries. The industrialized and the underdeveloped nations alike saw a richer and more
prosperous future as a result of the peaceful applications of nuclear
energy, and saw the IAEA as "an organization in which each could
contribute to 'realize that future."50
The preceding array of long-range expectations constitutes the
over-all context within which the twenty-three-article Statute and its
Annex have been brought into existence. The major provisions of
the Statute center around the objectives and functions of the Agency, 1 its membership,52 organs,53 activities,54 and finances.5 5 To these
are added complementary provisions which ensure certain privileges
and immunities, 56 determine the Agency's proposed relationship with
the United Nations5 7 and other organizations,5" and envisage amendments, 59 and the settlement of disputes.6 °
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.

51
52
53
54
55

Arts.
Arts.
Arts.
Arts.
Arts.

II and III.
IV; XVIII, pars. D and E; XIX, par. B.
V, VI, and VII.
VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
XIII; XIV; XIX, par. A.

56 Art. XV.

57 Art. XVI.

58 Ibid.
59 Art. XVIII, pars. A, B, and C.
60 Art. XVII.
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Objectives and Functions
The Statute provides for a flexible constitutional framework
which seems to allow for growth in any direction if that proves desirable. The broad objectives of the Agency are, on the one hand,
to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy
to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world,"'" and, on the
other hand, to "ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided
by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used
in such a way as to further any military purpose." ' Thus, it seems
that the sole limitation on the function of the IAEA is that it cannot concern itself with the use of atomic energy for military purposes.
Apart from this, it will be able to "perform any operation or service" found "useful" by its Members in the peaceful application of
nuclear power.

63

The main functions and activities of the IAEA may be arranged
under two convenient categories which correspond to its objectives:
first, those concerning the promotion of the peaceful uses of the
atom, and, second, those relating to its safeguards and safety
standards.
In promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Agency is
authorized: "to encourage and assist" research on, as well as development and practical application of nuclear power;6 4 "to act as an
intermediary" between Governments for the purposes of "securing"
services or "supplying" materials, equipment or facilities;0 5 to "make
7
provision" for the same; 6 6 to "foster" the exchange of information;1
61 Art. II; docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 14, pp. 6, 11; IAEA/CS/Art. II/Amend. 1.
62 Art. II.
63 Art. III, sub-par. A-1; docs. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 8; IAEA/CS/OR. 12,
pp. 22-25; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 6; IAEA/CS/COORD/2.
64 Art. III, sub-par. A-i; doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 22, pp. 3, 21.
65 Ibid.
66 Art. III, sub-par. A-2 reads: "to make provision . . . for materials, services,
equipment, and facilities to meet the needs for research on, and development and
practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production
of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas
of the world." An amendment proposed by Italy to add to this text the phrase, "and
of the countries whose economic development is seriously hampered by the scarcity
of traditional sources of power", was subsequently withdrawn. See docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
III/Amend: 11; IAEA/CS/OR. 14, p. 77.
67 Both scientific and technical information. See Art. III, sub-par. A-3, cf. Docs.
IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 1 and Amends. 2, 2/Rev. 1, and 9; IAEA/CS/OR. 22,
pp. 8-11, 16-17.
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to "encourage" the exchange and training of scientists; 6 8 and to "acquire and establish" facilities, plants, and equipment.6 9
In respect to the functions under the second category, the IAEA
is empowered to "establish and administer" safeguards in regard to
materials and assistance provided by it,7 0 and to "establish" control
over materials "received by" it, in order to ensure their peaceful application. 7' The Agency is also authorized to "establish or adopt"
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property. 7 Safeguards and standards of safety are
applied not only in regard to the Agency's all activities, 73 but on
request, to bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or to any activities of a requesting State in the field of atomic energy. 74
Before considering the Agency's proposed activities in connection with its constitutionally assigned functions of promoting the
68 Art. III, sub-par. A-4; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 2 and Rev. 1,
IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 11.
An amendment proposed by Poland to provide for the publication of an "international periodical" devoted to the peaceful uses of the atom, as suggested by the Tenth
General Assembly of the United Nations, and another amendment sponsored by Bolivia
and Ecuador to establish a "World University of the Atom" were subsequently withdrawn. See does. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amends. 2 and 9; cf. supra note 24.
69 Art. III, sub-par. A-7. President Eisenhower's original plan envisaged an agency
which would have been responsible for the physical custody and protection of an
international pool of fissionable materials. Later, the clearing-house concept came to
the foreground in order to speed up the establishment of the proposed organization.
Despite Czechoslovakia's insistence that the main function of the IAEA should be
assistance and not acquisition and establishment of facilities, plants, and equipment,
and that the latter, if permitted, should be financed by voluntary contributions only,
the Statute is flexible enough to allow for both functions. See U. N., General Assembly,
Official Records, 8th Sess., 470th Plenary Meeting, December 8, 1953, p. 454; Art. II
of the Draft Statute of the IAEA; Report of the Working Level Meeting on the
Draft Statute of the IAEA, Washington (1956), p. 1; does. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend.
3; IAEA/CS/OR. 14, p. 21; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, pp. 13-15; cf. doc. IAEA/CS/Art.
III/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 16.
70 Art. III, sub-par. A-5.
71 Ibid., sub-par. B-2. The.delegate of Haiti felt that it would be more appropriate
to use the phrase "distributed by" in lieu of the words "received by", since the latter
could be interpreted to mean that the Agency would be both the party and the judge
in matters of dispute. See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 16, p. 57.
72 Including such standards for labor conditions, see Art. III, sub-par. A-6, cf.
does. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 4; IAEA/CS/OR. 16, pp. 28-40; for a report on the
relations between the IAEA and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, see doc.
IAEA/CS/6.
73 Including those activities in which the Agency participates as an intermediary.
74 Art. III, sub-pars. A-5, and A-6. The United States was willing to accept the
application of the Agency's safeguards in regard to its own bilateral agreements, but
the Soviet Union opposed it in respect to its agreements, and, as a result, Thailand's
compromise amendment was adopted according to which the IAEA would apply
safeguards to such arrangements at "request" only. See does. IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend.
12; IAEA/CS/OR. 14, pp. 26, 41; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 11.
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peaceful uses of nuclear power and of applying safeguards and safety
standards, it seems convenient to review the statutory provisions concerning membership and organs.
Membership
A great deal of discussion and debate preceded the membership
provisions of the Statute. By invoking the principle of "universality",
the Soviet bloc nations 75 and some countries of the Asian-African
belt7" endeavored to ensure Communist China's participation in the
deliberations on the Agency. They raised the question at every phase
of the negotiations. 77 The Soviet Union repeatedly insisted that the
functions and objectives of the IAEA were such that all its activities
should be channelled for the service of all nations of the world without exception.78 The United States and many other nations, on the
other hand, were of the opinion that since most of the negotiations
concerning the creation of the Agency took place "under the aegis"
of the United Nations,7" only Members of the United Nations or of
the Specialized Agencies should participate."0
75 Yugoslavia sided with the Soviet bloc. See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 25, p. 51.
76 E.g. Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Syria, Yemen, see
docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 1, pp. 20-57; IAEA/CS/OR. 39, p. 61; IAEA/CS/Art. IV/Amend.
2.
77 See supra notes 26 and 31. At the Conference, the Soviet Union made an
unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the "so-called Chiang Kai-shek representatives of the
Island of Formosa", by demanding a vote on the report concerning the credentials
of the delegates. For details, see docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 25, pp. 2, 3, 20, 51; IAEA/CS/OR.
35, p. 20; IAEA/CS/7 and Corr. 1. The problem of Red China and its participation
in the Agency is essentially one of representation and not of membership. The State
Department rightly pointed out to Senator Hickenlooper's question that it is unlikely
that Red China would apply for membership, since it is certain that the Republic of
China would already have adhered to the Statute of the Agency and to apply would
constitute an acceptance by the Red Regime of a "Two-China" concept. So far, the
United States has successfully defeated efforts to seat Red China through a vote in the
Credentials Committee. The vote required on such a question will depend upon the
rules of procedure adopted by the General Conference. It may be noted in this connection that whereas a requirement of a two-thirds majority would facilitate the rejection of any move to seat the representatives of Communist China, it would, on the
other hand, make it more difficult to approve the credentials of the representatives of
the Republic of China if they are vhallenged. See New York Tines, May 12, 1957, p. 41.
78 Doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 1, pp. 16-20. Echoing the Soviet Union's view, Poland
charged that the Western Powers were opposed for political motives to the participation
of Communist China, East Germany, Mongolia, North Viet-Nam and North Korea.
See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 18, p. 13.
79 The phrase "under the aegis" of the United Nations originated in President
Eisenhower's address to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, and was repeatedly
mentioned during the negotiations in the General Assembly. The term was used again
in the Secretary-General's report on the relationship of the IAEA to the United Nations.
See doc. IAEA/CS/5.
80 The IAEA is the only international organization of its kind which the United
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The Statute in its final form provides for two types of membership. Initial Members are those States Members of the United Nations or the Specialized Agencies which have signed the Statute within
ninety days after its opening for signatures ' and have subsequently
deposited their instruments of ratification. 2 The second type of
membership involves admission 3 to the Organization which is open
to all other States, whether or not Members of the United Nations
or any of the Specialized Agencies which, according to the Board of
Governors and the General Conference of the IAEA, are "able and
willing" to carry out the obligations of membership. In recommending or approving a State for membership, the Board and the General Conference are also bound to give due consideration to the applicant's "ability and willingness" to act in accordance with the pur4
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter.1
In addition to admission, the Statute also provides for withdrawals and suspension from membership. A member may withdraw at
"any time after five years" from the date when the Statute takes
effect or whenever a member is unwilling to accept an amendment.8 5
Members are constitutionally bound to "fulfill in good faith" the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Statute,88 and a
Nations has taken the initiative in and the responsibility for its establishment from the
very beginning. See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 12, p. 12; cf. 33 Dept. of State Bul. 803 (Nov.
14, 1955).
81 The Statute was open for signature on October 26, 1956, see Art. XXI, par. A.
82 Ibid. and Article IV, par. A. The Soviet bloc opposed the limiting of initial
membership to the States Members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies.
See docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 11, p. 32; IAEA/CS/OR. 17, p. 32; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, pp. 3435; IAEA/CS/OR. 35, p. 82; IAEA/CS/Art. IV/Amend. 3; IAEA/CS/Art. XXI/Amend. 1.
83 The admission must be approved by the General Conference upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, see Art. IV, par. B. Many underdeveloped countries
opposed the subordination of admission of new members to the recommendation of the
Board. See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 10, pp. 6-7.
84 The Soviet bloc insisted that admission of a State should not be made dependent
upon any condition other than its ability and willingness to perform the obligations
deriving from membership in the Agency. Yugoslavia following the same line of thought
emphasized that the membership provisions of the Statute introduced certain elements
into the criteria governing admission which the Agency hardly appears competent to
consider and which make an unwarranted discrimination between initial and other
members possible. See doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 10, p. 39; Report of the Working Level
Meeting on the Statute of the IAEA, Washington, 1956, p. 1.
85 The withdrawal is effected by notice in writing to the depositary Government
which has to inform promptly the Board of Governors and all members. Withdrawal
by a member from the Agency does not effect its contractual or budgetary obligations
for the year in which it withdraws. See Art. XVIII, pars. D and E; docs. IAEA/CS/OR.
35, pp. 23-26; IAEA/CS/OR. 37, p. 60.
86 The decision by the General Conference concerning suspension is taken by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. See Art. IV, par. C.
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member which has persistently violated the statutory provisions or
the stipulations of any agreement entered into pursuant to the Statute
may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership by the General Conference upon recommendation by the
87
Board.

Organs
In the center of another heated controversy were the powers and
composition of the two major organs of the Agency: the Board of
Governors and the General Conference. There was in evidence a
strong pressure exerted by some of the underdeveloped nations8 and,
to a lesser extent, by the Soviet bloc to increase the authority of the
General Conference at the expense of the Board.8 9 At the same time,
many underdeveloped nations invoked the principle of "equality" and
demanded broad representation for themselves on the Board of GovernorsY0 The reasons were quite apparent. In the General Conference in which all the Members are entitled to representation, 9' the large
Asian-African group hoped to be in a better position to influence
actual decision making, than in the Board on which only some countries are represented. 92 On the other hand, if the reins of power were
to remain in the hands of the governing Board, the underdeveloped
nations felt that only their wide representation could secure for them
effective participation in its policy making.
While the United States was not opposed to the principle of
"equality", it was keenly aware of the tremendous gap in resources
and technical skill among the nations of the world and of the actual
S

Art. XIX, par. B; doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 35, p. 62.

88 These countries included Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico,

Syria, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, see docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 7, pp. 44-5; IAEA/CS/OR. 10,
pp., 18, 23.; IAEA/CS/OR. 11, pp. 7-10, 46; IAEA/CS/OR. 12, p. 17.
89 The Soviet bloc countries supported the idea that the General Conference should
have the right to make decisions binding upon the Board on matters relating to the
Agency's functions and that it should be empowered to "determine the general policy"
of the Agency. See Report of the Working Level Meeting on the Statute of the IAEA,
Washington, 1956, pp. 2-4; docs. IAEA/CS/Art. V/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 42.
90 Doc. IAEA/CS/Art. VI/Amends. 5 and 6; doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 23, pp. 4, 12-15.
In addition, the Soviet bloc nations insisted on permanent representation for Communist China on the Board of Governors, see Report of the Working Level Meeting, p. 2;
doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 9, pp. 33-5.
91 The General Conference consists of representatives of all members. Each member has one vote and is represented by one delegate who may he accompanied by alternates and by advisers, see Art. V, pars. A, B, and C.
92 For the composition of the Board of Governors, see Art. VI, par. A; each
member of the Board has one vote, see ibid., par. E; cf. notes 122-130 below.
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dependence of the Agency's initial success on the degree of support
given by a relatively few countries. Thus the United States felt very
strongly that the management of the Agency must take advantage
of the experience and technical ability of the advanced nations and
give them a special voice in decisions."
A comparison of the statutory powers of the General Conference
and the Board of Governors, as well as the composition of the latter
seems to indicate that the efforts of the underdeveloped countries were
not crowned with complete success. While the final allocation of authority between the two organs constitutes a significant departure
from the original Draft in favor of the General Conference, 94 a glance
at the respective provisions reveals that the Board remains the major
policy making organ of the Agency though some of its important
powers are shared with the General Conference. Among the latter
must be included: the election of the members of the Board, 95 admission of states to membership, 96 suspension of membership rights, 7
consideration of the annual report on the activities of the Agency,9"
determination of the budget,99 submission of reports to the United
Nations and other organizations, °° entering into agreements with the
United Nations and other organizations, 101 exercise of certain finan93 34 Dept. of State Bul. 901 (May 28, 1956); cf. doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 3, pp. 1-15.
94 Whereas under the original Draft, the Board was entrusted with "complete

authority" to carry out the statutory functions and "determine the policies" of the
IAEA, under the Statute the Board has only "authority" to implement the functions
.of the Agency. Furthermore, whereas the Draft made no mention
of the General Conference's authority to "discuss" matters, the Statute empowers the General Conference
to "discuss" any matter within the scope of the Statute. See Art. VII, par. H of the
Draft Statute; Art. V, par. D, and Art. VI, par. F of the Statute.
95 The Board "designates", whereas the General Conference "elects" the members
of the Board, see Art. V, sub-par. E-1; Art. VI, pars. A and B.
96 The Board "recommends", whereas the General Conference "approves" a State
for membership, see Art. V, sub-par. E-2; Art. IV, par. B; cf. note 83 above.
97 Whereas the Board "recommends" suspension, the General Conference "suspends"
a member by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, see Art. V,
sub-par. E-3; Art. XIX, par. B.
98 While the Board "prepares" the annual report concerning the activities of the
Agency, the General Conference "considers" the report, see Arts. V, sub-par. E-4; Art.
VI, par. 1.
99 The Board "submits" the annual budget estimate for the expenses of the Agency,
whereas the General Conference "approves" it, or "returns" it with its "recommendations" for resubmission, see Art. V, sub-par. E-5; Art. XIV, par. A; for details see
note 204 below.
110 The Board "prepares" the reports, the General Conference "submits" them to
the United Nations, or "returns" them to the Board with its "recommendations", see
Art. V, sub-par. E-6; Art. I, sub-pars. B-4, B-5; Art. VI, sub. par: J.
101 The Board "enters" into the agreement, the General Conference "approves" or
"returns" it with its "recommendations" to the Board for "resubmission", see Art. V,
sub-par. E-7; Art. XVL
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cial powers,10 2 amending, 03 appointment of the Director General,10 4
and determination of the regulations governing the staff. 05
Beyond the exercise of their shared powers and their respective
procedural powers, 0 6 however, the authority of the General Conference
and that of the Board seem to be miles apart. Thus the General Conference is in no position to "take decisions" except on matters specifically referred to it by the Board.0 " Otherwise, apart from "fixing
the scale" in regard to the bearing of certain administrative expenses, 0 8 the General Conference can only "discuss" or "make recommendations"' 1°9 on questions or matters within the scope of the Statute, 1 0 and can only "propose" matters for consideration by the
Board"' or "request" from it reports relating to the functions of the
12
Agency.
The Board, on the other hand, has authority not only to determine the quantities of source materials 18 which the Agency will
102 The General Conference "approves" the rules and limitations, whereas the
Board has the "authority" to exercise borrowing powers and to "accept" voluntary contributions made to the Agency. The Board "determines", the General Conference "approves" the use of the general fund. See Arts. V, sub-par. E-8; XIV, pars. F and G.
Cf. note 211 below.
103 The Board "submits" observations on proposed amendments, the General
Conference "considers" and "approves" them by a two-thirds majority of those present
and voting. See Art. V, sub-par. E-9; Art. XVIII, sub-par. C-i.
104 The Board "appoints" the Director General with the "approval" of the General Conference. See Art. V, sub-par. E-10; Art. VII, par. A.
105 The regulations are "made" by the Board, subject to general rules "approved"
by the General Conference on the "recommendation" of the Board. See Art. VII, par. E.
106 Both the General Conference and the Board of Governors "elect" their own
officers and "adopt" their own rules of procedure. While the General Conference "determines" the categories of questions which in addition to those specified by the Statute
are decided by a two-thirds majority, the Board "determines" its place of meeting,
"establishes" committees and "appoints" persons to represent it. See Arts. V, par. C;
VI, pars. G, H, and I.
Both the Board and the General Conference make their decisions by a simple
majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on financial questions, however,
require a two-thirds majority. In addition, a two-thirds majority is required in the
General Conference in connection with amendments and suspension from membership.
It may be noted that in the General Conference a simple majority constitutes a quorum,
whereas a two-thirds majority is required for the same on the Board. See Arts. V, par.
C; VI, par. E; XIV, par. H; XVIII, par. C; XIX, par. B. Cf. Does. IAEA/CS/Art.
XIV/Amends. 1 and 4; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, pp. 24-25.
107 Art. V, sub-par. F-l.
1os Art. XIV, par. D.
109 Art. V, par. D.
110 Such recommendations may be made to the membership of the Agency or
to the Board or to both. Ibid.
111 Art. V, sub-par. F-2.
112 Ibid.
113 The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
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accept,114 and to approve changes in the quantities, form and composition of materials, made available by members," 5 as well as to
reimburse members furnishing materials, services and facilities to the
Agency" 8 but, above all, it is empowered "to carry out the functions
of the Agency" in accordance with the Statute." 7 Under this blanket
provision, the Board is authorized inter alia to arrange and approve
Agency projects,"" to assume rights and responsibilities in connection
with the application of safeguards and safety standards," 9 and, in
general, to implement all the statutory functions of the IAEA which
have not been specifically reserved to the General Conference. 2 °
An analysis of the admittedly complex structure of the Board
similarly indicates that the formula arrived at represents only a partial victory for the underdeveloped countries. At best, it is a compromise, a delicate balance of the various interests which had to be
taken into account. As Ambassador Wadsworth put it: It is "a
political solution aimed at maintaining the principle of equality, yet
recognizing the fact that some countries are far ahead of others in
atomic development."' Thus it is no surprise to find that the atomically advanced countries occupy a predominant position on the Board.
Under the provisions of Article VI, members most advanced in
the technology of atomic energy, including the production of source
materials, are designated each year by the outgoing Board 22 from
eight specified geographic regions, namely: North America, Latin
America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle
East, 2 3 South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the Far
occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other
material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of
Governors will from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of
Governors will from time to time determine. See Art. XX, par. 3.
314 Art. IX, par. B.
115 Ibid., par. E.
116 Art. XIII.
117 Art. VI, par. F.
118 Art. XI, pars. B, C, D, and F.
119 Art. XII.
120 Art. VI, par. F.
121 35 Dept. of State Bul. 925 (Dec. 10, 1956).
122 In case of the first Board, the Preparatory Commission makes the designation,
see Art. VI, sub-par. A-1; Annex I to the Statute, sub-par. C-4.
123 Several Asian and African nations, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Syria
and Tunisia, demanded separate representation for Africa. See Docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
VI/Amends. 5 and 6; IAEA/CS/OR. 23, pp. 4, 12-15; cf. also Report of the Working
Level Meeting, p. 2.
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East.'24 In this group must be the five leading nations in the field
of atomic technology and the production of source materials. 125 In
addition, two members who are large producers of nuclear source
materials have to be designated by the Board 21 from among four
other producers of source materials, namely, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal. 27 Also one other member must be similarly named as a supplier of technical assistance.' 28 Finally, the General Conference is empowered to elect ten members with due regard
to equitable representation on the Board as a whole of the members
in the eight designated areas, so that the Board include in this category a representative of each of the areas except North America. 29
Presumably, the five members to be designated as the most advanced
in the technology of atomic energy would be Canada, France, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus the
Board of Governors would consist of twenty-three members. 8 '
Another aspect of the dispute over the powers of the Board and
the General Conference was the appointment of the Director General, the chief administrative officer of the Agency.' While the underdeveloped countries failed in their attempts to confer this important
power on the General Conference, 3 2 - they succeeded in making it sub124 Art. VI, sub-par. A-1.
125

Ibid.

126 In the case of the first Board, the Preparatory Commission makes the designation, see Art. VI, sub-par. A-2; Annex I to the Statute, sub-par. C-4.
127 Art. VI, sub-par. A-2.
128 All the designations heretofore mentioned take place not less than sixty days
before each regular annual session of the General Conference. The members designated
hold office from the end of the next regular annual session of the General Conference
after their designation until the end of the following regular annual session. See Art.
VI, pars. B and C.
No member in the category of the four producers of source materials and of the
suppliers of technical assistance in any one year is eligible for redesignation in the
same category for the following year. See Art. VI, sub-par. A-2.
129 The elections take place at the regular annual sessions of the General Conference. Members elected to the Board by the General Conference hold office from the
end of the regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are elected
until the end of the second regular annual session thereafter. In the election of the
members for the first Board, however, five are chosen for a term of one year. Apart
from these five, no member in this category in any one term of office is eligible for
reelection in the same category for the following term of office. See Art. VI, sub-par.
A-3, pars. B, C, D.
130 A scrutiny of the respective provisions indicates that the Statute does not set
the Board's membership at a fixed number.
131 Art. VII, par. A.
132 Poland and Pakistan pressed unsuccessfully for the appointment of the Director General by the General Conference upon or without the recommendation of the
Board, respectively. See does. IAEA/CS/Art. VII/Amends. I and 4; IAEA/CS/OR.
26, pp. 2-6, 13; cf. note 104 above.
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ject to the approval of the latter. 133 Appointed by the Board for a
term of four years,'1 34 the Director General remains under its authority and control.1 35 As head of the international .staff, he is responsible for the appointment, organization and functioning of the
staff1 6 which includes the minimum number required of qualified
scientific and technical and other personnel. 37 Highest standards of
efficiency, technical competence and integrity are the paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of the staff with due
regard to geographical representation and to the contributions of
members to the Agency. 3 Both the Director General and the members of the staff are obligated to refrain from seeking or receiving
instructions "from any source external to the Agency," and to refrain from any action which "might reflect on their position as officials°
4
of the Agency"J"9 Subject to their responsibilities to the Agency,
they are not permitted to disclose any industrial secrets or other
confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of
their official duties for the Agency.' 41
Activities Promoting the Peaceful Uses of the Atom
By any interpretation it seems clear that the IAEA would be
confined to the limited activities of a clearing-house and could not
provide information, materials, services and facilities, unless it had
first acquired these requisites. Accordingly, the Statute urges each
m ember to make available such information as would in the judgment of the member be helpful to the Agency.' 42 While the language
of this provision does not imply a mandatory obligation, other mem'33

Art. VII, par. -A.

134 Ibid. For an amendment introduced by the Philippines to change the Director

General's term of office from four to six years, see doc. IAEA/CS/Amend. 2.
135 Art. VII, par. B.
136

Ibid., pars. A, B.

137 Ibid., par. C; cf. doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 20, pp. 62-64.
138 Art. VII, par. D; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Amend. 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 26, pp. 11-12.

In reply to Senator Hickenlooper the State Department's spokesman pointed out
that there is no provision in the Statute which would permit the United States to
approve or. disapprove of employees, whether or not of American citizenship. However, American citizens will be employed by the Agency only after they have been
investigated and their loyalty to the United States has been determined under provisions of Executive Order 10420, as amended. See New York Times, May 12, 1957,
p. 41.
139 Art. VII, par. F.
140 This stipulation was

adopted on Switzerland's suggestion, see docs. IAEA/CS/Amend, 5 and Rev. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 26, p. 12.
14" Art. VII, par. F.
142 Art. VIII, par. A; cf. doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 30, p. 62.
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bers receiving assistance from the Agency are specifically charged to
make available to the Organization all scientific information developed as a result of such assistance. 43 The information received must
then be assembled and made accessible by the Agency. 144 In addition, the IAEA is obligated to take positive steps to encourage exchange of information among its members concerning the nature and
the peaceful uses of the atomic energy and to serve as an intermedi145
ary among its members for this purpose.
Beyond furnishing information, members "may" also make
available to the Agency special fissionable materials, 146 source materials 147 and other materials, as well as services, equipment, and
facilities. 1 48 The materials thus provided may, at the discretion of
the supplying member, be stored either by the member concerned or,
with the agreement of the IAEA, in the latter's depots. 4 9
While the Statute knows of no compulsory supplies or contributions, it does require each member to notify the Agency of the quantities, form and composition of special fissionable materials, source
materials and other materials which that member is prepared to make
available immediately or during a period set by the Board. 1 0
143 Art. VIII, par. B.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239;

uranium-233;

uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of
the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors will from

time to time determine; but the term "special fissionable material" does not include
source material.
The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means uranium containing
the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the
sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235
to the isotope 238 occurring in nature. See Art. XX, pars. 1 and 2.
147 For a definition of the term "source material", see note 113 above.
148 Art. IX, pars. A, B; Art. X.
An amendment sponsored by Denmark and Pakistan to substitute the word
"should" for the word "may" was subsequently withdrawn. See IAEA/CS/Art.
X/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 26, p. 27.
149 Art. IX, par. A.

150 Art. IX, par. C. An initial notification must be made within three months
of the entry into force of the Statute with respect to the member concerned. In the
absence.og a contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made
available will be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when the
Statute takes effect with respect to the member concerned. Subsequent notification will
likewise, in the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to the period of the
calendar year following the notification and will be made no later than the first day of
November each year. Ibid., par. F.
It may be noted that the Soviet Union in a letter dated July 18, 1955, pledged to
contribute 50 kilograms of uranium 235 to the Agency. At that time the United States
had indicated a contribution of 100 kilograms, and the United Kingdom three years
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Once the agreement between a supplying member and the IAEA
in regard to the items to be furnished and their reimbursement has
been entered into,' 5 ' and a request from the Agency has been received
by the member, it is the latter's duty, without delay to deliver to a
designated member (or group of members) such quantities of such
materials as the IAEA may specify. 152 Similarly, the member pledging the supplies is bound to deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and scientific research in the facilities of the IAEA.15 3 The items so furnished will be used as determined by the Board of Governors. No
member has the right to require that the materials it supplies to the
Agency be kept separately by the latter or to designate the specific
project in which they must be used. 154
The Statute enables any member (or group of members), desiring to set up a project or continue an already existing project
for research on, or development or practical application of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, to request the assistance of the Agency
in securing materials, services, equipment and facilities necessary for
ago offered to make available 20 kilograms. Subsequently, the United States offered
to make available 5000 kilograms which is the largest quantity yet offered to the
Agency.
In answering questions raised by Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa, the State Department emphasized that there is no "substantial evidence" that the Soviet Union would
contribute large amounts to the Agency if the United States did not join it but the
advantage to them in seizing world leadership in the field of atomic energy would offer
them a strong inducement to make such contributions. See New York Tines, May 12,
1957, p. 41.
151 Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the member
furnishing to the Agency materials and services, the Board will enter into an agreement
with such member providing for reimbursement for the items furnished. See Art. XIII.
152 Art. IX, par. D.
153 Ibid. The Agency will specify the place and method of delivery and, where
appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has requested a member to
deliver from the amounts which that member has notified the Agency it is prepared
to make available. The Agency will also verify the quantities of materials delivered
and will report those quantities periodically to the members. The quantities, form and
composition of materials made available by any member may be changed at any time
by the member with the approval of the Board of Governors. Ibid. pars. E, and G.
An amendment supported by Egypt, Indonesia and Syria to the effect that adequate
reasons be given for any such change and that projects being carried out in the recipient
countries be not prejudiced thereby, was defeated. See doc. IAEA/CS/Art. IX/Amend.
2; doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 26, pp. 16-17.
154 Art. IX, par. J. No country could itself require the return of fissionable materials that have actually been delivered to the Agency or to an Agency project. Nor
can the Agency require the return of payment made for such materials. See the State
Department's reply to Senator Hickenlooper's question, New York Times, May 12,
1957, p. 41.
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Members may also request the IAEA's assistance in

making arrangements for the financing of such projects from outside
sources.' 56 Pursuant to the request, the Agency may arrange for the
supplying of the type of assistance (materials, services, equipment
and facilities) necessary for the project either directly by itself or
through one or more members, taking into consideration the wishes
of the member (or members) making the request. 5 "
For the purpose of considering the project, the IAEA may send
into the territory of the member or members making the request a
person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this end, the
Agency may, with the approval of the member or members making
the request, use its own personnel or employ suitably qualified nationals of any member. 5l
In weighing the pros and cons of the project, it is the duty of
the Board of Governors to consider: the general usefulness 5 9 and
adequacy of the project 6 ' and of the proposed health and safety
standards; 61' the inability of the would-be recipient or recipients to
secure assistance; 161 the equitable distribution of the Agency's resources; 163 the special needs of the underdeveloped areas;164 and such
6
other matters as may be relevant.

5

Once the project is approved by the Board, the IAEA and the
member or members submitting the project conclude a special agreement for the allocation and transfer of materials' 6 from their then
155 Any such agreement must be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose
and extent of the project. See Art. XI, pars. A and G.
156 In extending this assistance, the Agency is not required to provide any guarantee
or to assume any financial responsibility for the project. Ibid., par. B; cf. IAEA/CS/Art.
XI/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 28, p. 25.
157 Art. XI, par. C; Cf. IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 4 and Rev. 1; IAEA/CS/OR.
28, pp. 2-5.
158 Art. XI, par. D.
159 Including its scientific and technical feasibility, ibid., sub-par. E-1.
160 Including the adequacy of funds and technical personnel to assure the effective
execution of the project. Ibid., sub-par. E-2.
161 Ibid., sub-par. E-3.
162 Ibid., sub-par. E-4.
163 Ibid., sub-par. E-5.
164 Ibid., sub-par. E-6. This provision was included on the proposal of Denmark
and Pakistan, see IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR. 27, p. 6; IAEA/CS/OR.
28, pp. 2-5.
165 Art. XI, sub-par. E-7; cf. IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amends. 2 and 4 and Rev. 1;
IAEA/CS/OR. 28, pp. 2-5.
166 The transfer is to be made under conditions which ensure the safety of any
shipment required, and meet applicable health and safety standards. See Art. XI, subpar. F-2.
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place of custody' 67 to the member or members requesting the assistance. 6 8 Additional stipulations to be included in the agreement relate to the terms and conditions of the assistance,.. 9 to pledges by
the recipients concerning non-military use and certain safeguards, 7 °
to the rights and interests in inventions or discoveries, or patents
172
7
therein, arising from the project,' ' to the settlement of disputes,'
73
and other appropriate measures.

Activities Concerning Safeguards and Standards of Safety
A great deal of discussion in the course of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Statute of the IAEA centered around the
problem of ensuring that assistance provided by the Agency or at its
request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way
as to further any military purpose or jeopardize health or safety.
The gravity of the question of control grew out of the realization
that the peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy can
never be far apart. The fuel for a reactor can be used in a bomb, the
radiation which cures can also adversely affect life. Thus without
adequate safeguards the Agency's assistance could be diverted from
peaceful to military purposes, and could also endanger health and
safety. The problem of safeguards, the burdens and intrusions of
inspection and control, proved to be a particularly complex and delicate question because of the effect they could have upon the sovereignty and independence of members.
167 The materials may be either in the custody of the Agency or in that of the
member making them available for use in Agency projects. Ibid.
168 Ibid., sub-pars. F-1, F-2.
169 These include charges, on which any materials, services, equipment and facilities
are to be provided by the Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment,
and facilities are to be provided by a member, the terms and conditions as arranged
for by the member or members submitting the project and the supplying member. See
Art. XI, sub-par. F-3.
170 Ibid., sub-par. F-4.
171 Ibid., sub-par. F-5. A proposal by Pakistan and Denmark to limit the Agency's
rights to those inventions and discoveries "directly" arising from its assistance was
rejected, see IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR. 28, pp. 7-16.
It may be of interest to note that the United States, the United Kingdom and
Canada concluded last year an agreement interchanging rights in inventions and discoveries in the atomic energy field. See 35 Dept. of State Bul. 540-2 (Oct. 8, 1956).
172 Art. XI, sub-par. F-6; IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 3.
173 Art. XI, sub-par. F-7; IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 2. The Syrian representative
felt that the reference to such other measures "as may be appropriate" was ambiguous
and dangerous. He would have liked to have it restricted in the sense that the Agency
would not make its assistance subject to any political, economic, military and other
conditions incompatible with the Statute. See IAEA/CS/OR. 10, pp. 8-10.
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While Moscow initially paid lip service to the principle of
sovereign equality and insisted that any positive encouragement of
the peaceful development of atomic energy would add to world insecurity by increasing the supply of materials from which nuclear
weapons could be made, later it accepted Washington's view that
the right solution to the problem lay in the application of appropriate safeguards and not in the curtailment of non-military utilization.174 Despite the general consensus of opinion of the leading
atomic powers, 1 75 it was no easy task to avoid the charge made by
some of the underdeveloped countries that the controls would be imposed by the "have" nations on the "have not" countries. 1 0
Although the less developed nations were to be the primary beneficiaries of the program, they felt that by the imposition of safeguards
and safety standards the Agency might infringe upon their sovereignty. Represented most eloquently by India, 177 they at first argued
that the safeguards were too onerous or too rigid. They seemed to
find little comfort in the statutory assurances that the Agency is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members; 78
that its activities will be carried out with due observance of the
sovereign rights of the States,1 9 and in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the -United Nations, and in conformity with the
-74 IAEA/CS/OR. 3, pp. 23-25. Washington's objective was to establish an effective
"comprehensive system uniformly applied". See 34 Dept. of State Bul. 900 (May 28,
1956).
175 Australia, Belgium, France and Great Britain were all urging strict control, see
does. IAEA/CS/OR. 7, p. 91, IAEA/CS/OR. 11, p. 57.
176 Due to the fact that uranium and thorium and other fissionable materials are
widely distributed all over the globe, it may happen, however, that a country which is
today classified among the "have-nots" will in the future be in a position to be one
of the major producing countries for such materials. See does. IAEA/CS/OR. 7 pp. 27,
48; IAEA/CS/OR. 12, p. 16.
177 Other nations besides India included Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Indonesia,
Poland, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia, see does. IAEA/CS/OR. 10, pp. 28-35;
IAEA/CS/OR. 11, pp. 7-10, 33-35; IAEA/CS/OR. 38, pp. 31-35; IAEA/CS/Art.
XII/Amend. 5.
178 Art. IV, par. C.
179 Art. III, par. D reads: "Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the
terms of agreements concluded between a State or a group of States and the Agency
which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the activities of the
Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign rights of States."
While the Soviet Union wanted a clearly formulated provision that all activity of
the Agency would be conducted with proper observance of the sovereign rights of
members of the Agency, the United States opposed it on the ground that it might have
the effect of relieving members from commitments voluntarily entered into on the
ground that their discharge would be inconsistent with the rights of sovereignty. See
does. IAEA/CS/OR. 16, p. 92; IAEA/CS/OR. 17, p. 11; IAEA/CS/OR. 22, p. 21;
IAEA/CS/Art. I/Amend. 2/Rev. 1.
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policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament, and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies;180 in allocating its resources the IAEA will bear in mind the special needs of
the underdeveloped areas of the world;' 8 ' and that it will not make
its assistance subject to any political, economic, military or other
conditions incompatible with the Statute'82
Notwithstanding the strong opposition displayed by many underdeveloped nations, the Statute empowers the Agency to establish a
network of safeguards designed to permit peaceful development of
1 83
atomic energy without jeopardy to world safety and security.
Under the broad limitation that safeguards are applicable only
to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement in question, Article XII spells out more precisely the degree of control needed at various stages of atomic processing, recognizing that the inspection of
the movement of raw materials need not be as precise as the inspection of the chemical processing plants.1 84 Accordingly, the IAEA is

authorized to examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, 8 5 and to approve it but only from the viewpoint that it will not
further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health
and safety standards, and that it will permit effective application of
the respective safeguards. 88 In other words, the Agency's right to
approve or disapprove the design cannot be based on any criterion
unrelated to safeguards.
180 Egypt felt that the Agency should conduct its activities in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations rather than in conformity
with any other international agreements entered into pursuant to the disarmament
policies of the United Nations. It opposed any provision restricting a member's right to
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. Ethiopia also emphasized that the principles of the Statute do not impair the right of members to do as they see fit outside the
framework of the Statute. See docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 9, pp. 33-35, IAEA/CS,/OR. 12,
pp. 12-15.
181 Art. XI, sub-par. E-6.
182 Art. III, par. C.
183 The statutory provisions on safeguards are reminiscent of the respective provisions of some of the bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and
many other countries for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. See, for
example, the Agreement between the United States and France, signed on June 20,
1956, which envisages integration of its safeguards system into the control system of
an international agency, should the latter come into being. See 35 Dept. of State
Bul. 9 (July 2, 1956).
184 Art. XII, par. A.
185 These include nuclear reactors, see Art. XII, sub-par. A-1; cf. docs.
IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 37, p. 102.
186 Ibid.
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Beyond exercising the right of examination and approval, the
IAEA is also empowered to prescribe health and safety measures and
require their observance. 8 7 Other safeguards deal with the maintenance of operating records to provide accountability for source and
and with progress reports. 8 ' Still
special fissionable materials,'
another safeguard, perhaps the most crucial of all, requires that the
means used for chemical processing of materials irradiated in a
project must be approved by the Agency solely to ensure that the
processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military
purposes and will comply with health and safety standards. 190
Since it is precisely the special fissionable materials recovered or
produced as a by-product which are the elements most readily susceptible to diversion for military use, and most dangerous to health
and safety, Article XII also authorizes the IAEA to require that
special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product
be used for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency safeguards
for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified
by the member or members concerned. 91 Furthermore, the same
Article empowers the IAEA to require the deposit with the Agency
of all such fissionable material in excess of what is immediately needed for the indicated uses in order to prevent the accumulation of
stockpiles. Materials so deposited will be returned to the countries
where they were bred for further peaceful uses whenever need
arises.' 92
Under sub-paragraph 6 of Article XII, the IAEA has the right
to send inspectors into the territory of the recipient States for the
10 3
purpose of verifying compliance with the applicable safeguards.
187 Ibid.. sub-par. A-2.
188 Ibid., sub-par. A-3; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR.
38, p. 29.

189 Art. XII, sub-par. A-4.
190 Ibid., sub-par. A-5; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR.

38, p. 31.

191 Ibid. Originally the Agency was authorized to specify the disposal of any
fissionable material produced or recovered in the processing of the allotted raw materials an4 to approve of means for the chemical processing of spent fuel elements. As
a result of continuing objection by the Asian-African nations provision was made to
retain under the Agency's control part of the by-products for non-military uses after
reprocessing.
192

Ibid.

193 See also Art. XII, par. C. The staff of inspectors will be established as
necessary by the Agency, see ibid., par. B.
Proposals to make the composition of inspectors a team of three powers, one
designated by the Soviet Union and two by the most advanced countries in the tech-
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Such inspectors will be designated by the Agency after consultation
with the State or States concerned. They will have access "at all
times to all places", persons 9 4 and data, necessary to account for
source and special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable
products and to determine whether there is compliance with the
undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose,
with health and safety measures, and with other conditions prescribed
1 95
in the agreement with the Agency.
The inspectors will report any non-compliance to the Director
General'" who will thereupon send the report to the Board of Governors. The Board will call upon the recipient State or States "to
remedy forthwith any non-compliance" and will report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. 97 In the event of failure to take corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may directly curtail or suspend the assistance being given and call for the return
of materials and equipment made available to the recipients.' 8 The
Agency may also suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership. 99
In regard to materials in the IAEA's possession, the Agency
nology of atomic energy were subsequently withdrawn. See docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
XII/Amend. 4; IAEA/CS/OR. 38, p. 37.
194 The inspectors will have access to any person who by reason of his occupation
deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by the Statute to be
safeguarded. See Art. XII, sub-par. A-6.
195 Inspectors designated by the Agency will be accompanied by representatives
of the authorities of the State concerned, if that State so requests, provided that the
inspectors will not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their
functions. Ibid., cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 1, Corr. 1 and Rev. 1;
IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5; IAEA/CS/OR. 37, pp. 103-5.
Ceylon, Egypt, India and Indonesia unsuccessfully proposed that the inspection of
plants for the chemical separation of special fissionable materials be undertaken only
on request of the recipient members. See doc. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 5.
196 The inspectors have no right to remove materials in case of non-compliance.
197 These bodies can take whatever actions are open to them under the Charter
of the United Nations, including the use of force. The Soviet Union would, of course,
be able to exercise the veto power, but it should be pointed out that the General
Assembly in its "Uniting for -Peace" resolution has found a way to act in situations
threatening international peace and security.
198 Art. XII, par. C. Poland unsuccessfully proposed that the Board's decision to
call for the return of materials and equipment be made by a two-thirds majority vote.
See docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 38, pp. 32-35.
199 Haiti's proposal
that the General Conference should coordinate proposed
measures in connection with non-compliance with the action of existing regional organizations under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter was equally unacceptable
to the Conference. See dos. IAEA/CS/Art. XII/Amend. 2 and Rev. 1; IAEA/CS/OR.
38, p. 39.
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bears the responsibility for their storage and protection, as well as
their safeguard against the hazards of the weather, unauthorized renioval or diversion, damage or destruction, including sabotage and
forcible seizure. 20 In storing these materials, the Agency is bound to
ensure such geographical distribution as to avoid concentration of
large amounts in any one country or region of the world. 2" The
staff of inspectors has the responsibility of examining all operations
conducted by the Agency itself to determine any non-compliance with
the safeguards and standards. In case of non-compliance, the Agency is obligated to take remedial action forthwith to correct any failure to take adequate measures.2 2
Finances
An important part of the statutory provisions deals with the
finances of the Agency. The respective articles and deliberations
around their drafting reveal that strong efforts were made by some
underdeveloped nations 2 3 to ensure a liberal policy and to place a
financial ceiling on the Agency's activities, so as not to burden the
smaller countries.
Under the Statute, the Director General prepares initially the
budget estimates which are then submitted by the Board of Governors to the General Conference for approval. 20 4 The expenditures of
the Agency are classified under two main categories, namely, administrative 0 5 and other expenses. 20 6 The former is apportioned among
200 Art. IX, par. H. In discharging its responsibility, the Agency is required to
establish or acquire as soon as practicable such of the following as may be necessary:
1. plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of materials;
2. physical safeguards;
3. adequate health and safety measures;
4. control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials received;
S. housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the foregoing.
Ibid., par. I.
201 Ibid., par. H.
202 Art. XII, par. B.
203 E.g. Afghanistan, Poland, and the Ukraine, see docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 11, pp. 7-10,
33-35; IAEA/CS/OR. 12, p. 51.
2o Art. XIV, par. A; cf. note 99 above.
205 Administrative expenses include:
(a) costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in connection
with materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to under non-administrative
expenses; costs of meetings; expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects
and for the distribution of information;
(b) costs of implementing the safeguards in relation to Agency projects or in relation
to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with the costs of handling and
storage of special fissionable material by the Agency other than the storage and handling
charges for materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the
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members by the Board" 7 in accordance with a scale to be fixed by
the General Conference, 208 whereas the latter is met by the imposition of "reasonable uniform storage and handling charges", for materials and services furnished to members by the Agency." 9 Any excess of revenue over the expenses and costs and any voluntary contributions to the Agency, are placed in a general fund to be used
as the Board with the approval of the General Conference may determine.210 The acceptance of voluntary contributions and the exercise of borrowing powers by the Board 211 are also subject to the rules
and limitations approved by the General Conference. 12
A member of the Agency which is in arrears in regard to the
payment of its financial contributions to the Agency has no vote in
the IAEA if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount
of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The
General Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote
Agency. See Art. XIV, sub-par. B-1; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 31, p. 61; IAEA/CS/OR.
36, pp. 14-15.
206 These include non-administrative expenses in connection with any materials,
facilities, plant, and equipment acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out
its authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and facilities
provided by it under agreements with one or more members. See Art. XIV,'sub-par. B-2.
207 In determining the expenditures in relation to costs of implementing the safeguards, the Board will deduct such amounts as are recoverable under agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency and parties to bilateral or
multilateral arrangements. See Art. XIV, par. C; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 32, pp. 37, 40;
IAE!A/CS/OR. 36, pp. 14-6.
208 In fixing the scale the General Conference will be guided by the principles
adopted by the United Nations in assessing contributions of Member States to the
regular budget of the United Nations. See Art. XIV, par. D; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
XIV/Amends. 2 and 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 31, p. 62; IAEA/CS/OR. 33, p. 16; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, pp. 19-20.
The majority of Member States represented on the Preparatory Commission envisage a total eventual employment of about 450 people with an annual assessment
budget of appfoximately $7,000,000. See New York Tizea, May 12, 1957, p. 41.
209 The scale of charges which is established periodically by the Board is designed
to meet the non-administrative expenses and costs "less any voluntary contributions
which the Board may apply for this purpose." The proceeds of such charges will be
placed in a separate fund which will be used to pay members for any materials, services,
equipment or facilities furnished by them and to meet other non-administrative expenses
which may be incurred by the Agency itself. See Art. XIV, par. E. For a clarification
of this paragraph, see Conference Room Paper No. 12/Rev. 1.
The Soviet Union unsuccessfully proposed to meet non-administrative expenses
out of the voluntary contributions by members of the Agency. See docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
XIV/Amend. 4; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, pp. 19-20.
210 Art. XIV, par. F; cf. note 102 above.
211 In respect of loans entered into pursuant to this authority, the Board may not
impose any liability on members of the Agency. See Art. XIV, par. G; cf. docs.
IAEA/CS/Art. XIV/Amends. 2 and 4; note 102 above.
212 Art. XIV, par. G; cf. also note 106, par. 2 above.
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if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond
2
the control of the member.

13

The complementary articles enabling the Agency to carry out its
activities smoothly and permitting to affect certain structural or functional changes include provisions on privileges and immunities, relationship with other organizations, amendments, and the settlement
of disputes.
Privileges and Immunities
The Agency will enjoy in the territory of each member such
legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the exercise of its functions.2 14 In addition, delegates of members, governors appointed to the Board, the Director General
and the staff of the Agency will also enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency 2 15 The legal capacity, privileges
and immunities will be defined in a separate agreement or agreements
between the Agency and the members. 10
Relationship with Other Organizations
There was a substantial divergence of views among the negotiating powers in regard to the question of the Agency's relationship
with the United Nations and other organizations. Some countries,
including the Soviet Union, felt that the role of the United Nations
in world affairs, and the complexity and exceptional nature of the
problems inherent in and connected with the establishing and functioning of an international agency in the field of atomic energy, made
it imperative that closer links be established between the United
Nations and the new Agency, than those between the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies.2 17 Many other nations, including the
United States, on the other hand, opposed the idea of rigid integration and the predetermination of the relationship in the Statute and
felt that the most appropriate form of relationship between the
United Nations and the Agency would be one similar to those of the
Art. XIX, par. A.
Art. XV, par. A.
215 Ibid., par. B.
216 The Agency will be represented by the Director General acting under instructions of the Board and the members. Ibid., par. C; cf. docs. IAEA/CS/Art. V/Amend.
1 and Rev. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 33, p. 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, p. 26.
217 Doc. IAEA/CS/OR. 10, pp. 31-32.
213
214
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Specialized Agencies. They felt that the final decision on the question of relationship did not rest with the negotiating nations but was
to be determined by the total membership of the Agency and the
United Nations. 18
The Statute makes some allowance for both views. First, it provides that the Agency will conduct its activities "in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations", 21 9 and will submit reports on its activities to the General Assembly of the United
Nations, to the Economic and Social Council and other organs on
matters within their respective competence.O The Agency will notify the Security Council, if in connection with the activities of the
Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence
of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. In such
cases, the Agency may also take other measures open to it under the
Statute. 22
Second, the Statute'provides that the Preparatory Commission
will enter into negotiations with the United Nations to prepare a draft
agreement on the appropriate relationship between the Agency and
the United Nations, and will make recommendations to the General
Conference and the Board concerning the relationship of the Agency
to other international organizations.2 22 With the approval of the General Conference, the Board is then authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements with the United Nations and any other international organizations the work of which is related to that of the Agency.223 Such agreements must provide not only for submission by the
Agency of the required reports to the organs of the United Nations
but also for consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it
adopted by the General Assembly or of any of the Councils of the
United Nations and for the submission of reports, when requested,
218 See 33 Dept. of State Bul. 664 (Oct. 24, 1955); 33 ibid. 799, 804 (Nov. 14,
1955). The United States, however, agreed to study the question of the relationship
of the IAEA to the United Nations even before the establishment of the Agency, and
th Secretary General in response to a request made by the General Assembly prepared a'
report in consultation with the Advisory Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy. See doc. IAEA/CS/5. Cf. note 15 above.
219 Art. Ir, sub-par. B-1.
220 Ibid., sub-pars. B-4, B-5.
221 Ibid., sub-par. B-4.
222 Annex I to the Statute, sub-par. C-7.
223 Art. XVi, par. A.
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to the appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken
2 24
by the Agency or by its members as a result of such consideration.
Amendments, Settlement of Disputes
The States negotiating the Statute of the IAEA were cognizant
of the immense potentialities of atomic energy. They realized that in
a relatively short time, its speed might increase and new discoveries
might radically change its present aspects. They felt that under these
circumstances it would be wise to provide for the necessary measures
of adaptability of the Agency to the rapidly evolving conditions in
the nuclear sphere, that is, of endowing it with a flexible and evolutionary, rather than a rigid and static structure; the very dynamics
of atomic energy seemed to call for the possibility of adjusting the
Statute to new situations.
The Statute is designed to assure that the Agency's operations
will be adaptable to changing circumstancbs. It recognizes the right
of any member to propose amendments.225 In addition, it provides
that the question of the general review of the statutory provisions
must be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the General Conference. If the General Conference approves it, the actual review
will take place at the subsequent General Conference. 220
The negotiating States also envisaged a special procedure for
the settlement of disputes. Under Article XVII any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Statute which
is not settled by negotiation will be referred to the International Court
of Justice, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.22 7 The General Conference and the Board, are separately
224 Ibid., par. B.
225 Art. XVIII, par. A.

Amendments come into force for all members when:
(1) approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of those present
and voting after consideration oft observations submitted by the Board of Governors
on each proposed amendment, and
(2) accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes. Acceptance by a member shall be affected by the deposit of
an instrument of acceptance'with the depositary Government. Ibid., par. C.
In the Draft Statute amendments had to be approved by the Board as well. This
was subsequently dropped from the text on the insistence of the underdeveloped nations.
See docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XVIII/Amends. I and 2; IAEA/CS/OR. 37, p. 27.
A Soviet-sponsored amendment to require three-fourths in lieu of a "two-thirds"
majority was defeated. See docs. .AEA/CS/Art. XVIII/Amend. 3; IAEA/CS/OR.
37, p. 30.
226 Thereafter proposals on the question of a general review may be submitted
for decision by the General Conference under the same procedure. See Art. XVIII,
par. B.
227 Art. XVII, par. A. Switzerland suggested that disputes arising from an agreement between the Agency and the members should be settled in accordance -vith
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mpowered,2 28 subject to authorization from the General Assembly
of the United Nations to request the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the
Agency's activities.229
Evaluation
The foregoing provisions of the Statute, as they emerged after
three years of lengthy negotiations and debates, reflect a spirit of
compromise, a practical balance of the interests and views of all
states. The Statute, however, is much more than a mere compromise.
Above all, it is a measuring rod of the general trends in the everchanging distribution of power in the world community, and a reflection of the degree of willingness on the part of the contracting
States to accept compromises. Interpreted in that light, the Statute
and the deliberations preceding it, reveal three major manifestations
of the world power process: first, a certain amount of realization by
the negotiators of their interdependences; second, the increasing demands of the less developed nations to take an active part in the decision making within the Agency; and third, the ability of the United
States to maintain the status quo in the existing pattern of international organizations against strong Soviet pressure for Communist
China's participation.
The first manifestation is apparent from the fact that the "have"
nations showed a willingness to share part of their material and technological means and knowledge with the "have not" nations. The
latter, on the other hand, indicated their willingness to accept a system of controls and safeguards, in a degree hitherto unknown in the
history of international organizations. The second trend is revealed
by the repeated attempts of underdeveloped nations to secure for
themselves a broad representation on the governing Board of the
Agency and their similar attempts to increase the powers of the
General Conference at the expense of the Board. Finally, the lack
of participation by Communist China in all phases of the negotiations
procedures established under that agreement. See docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/Amend.
I/Corr. 1; IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/Amend. 2/Revs. 1 and 3; IAEA/CS/OR. 33, pp. 4852; IAEA/CS/OR. 34, pp. 6-12.
228 The separate authorization of the Board and the General Conference was the
result of an amendment to the Draft Statute proposed by Mexico and the Netherlands.
See docs. IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/Amend. 2; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, pp. 28-31.
229 Art. XVII, par. B. It is not entirely clear whether the provision would include
those questions arising from the relationship that the Agency may enter into with
another organization to whom its work is related. Cf. Docs. IAEA/CS/OR. 34, pp. 4,
22; IAEA/CS/OR. 36, pp. 28-30.
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as well as the membership provisions of the Statute indicate that the
Soviet Union has not so far been able to marshal sufficient support
to change, but has been willing to accept, the present membership
structure of international organizations as championed by the United
States.
Beyond reflecting the over-all trends in the world power process,
the Statute is also indicative of the fundamental weakness of an international institution in our time. While the clauses relating to safeguards may be considered a significant step in the direction of a
general system of atomic inspection and control, a closer scrutiny
reveals that the statutory provisions, like those of many other international bodies, have not been able to bypass the barriers of the
nation-centered decision-making process. They seem to bear the imprint of an embryonic stage in the development of world institutions.
While the Agency has never been intended to prevent the making of atomic weapons by countries which already have the materials
and the know-how, or to prevent such nations from inventing them
later on their own or from getting them from a source which does not
insist on safeguards, the IAEA is clearly intended to prevent nations
from diverting its assistance from peaceful to military uses. Despite
this announced objective, the machinery and powers of the IAEA
remain inadequate to the maximum performance of its safeguarding tasks. Under the Statute, it would seem that the Agency
has no truly effective enforcement machinery at its disposal against a
recalcitrant state. The framers, themselves, must have been cognizant of this weakness in the control neasures, since the Statute
makes the rather startling but nonetheless open admission that the
IAEA is to ensure the non-military applications of its assistance only
in "so far as it is able."
Furthermore, it would also appear that the Agency's objective
is not entirely without ambiguity but carries the potential sources of
divergent interpretations which might further undermine the implementation of safeguards. While the aim of the Organization is to
accelerate the contributions of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world, there is little, if any indication of
the way in which the development of nuclear energy will contribute
to peace.230 Presumably, the underlying assumption is that by a
230 Article III, sub-par. A-2, refers to the development and practical application
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, "including the production of electric power."
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world-wide application of atomic power in industry, agriculture, and
medicine, the wealth and health standards of the peoples of the world
would improve, and, consequently, some of the economic and social
causes of war would be removed and the chances of peace would correspondingly increase. The extent of justifications for these expectations is a debatable question. Just as it may be extremely difficult to
determine the degree in which the discovery and use of electricity,
steam or water power have contributed to peace or added to the
horrors of warfare, it may be equally difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the actual applications of atomic energy will or
will not in a given situation contribute to peace. Thus atomic energy
for military purpose, as in the case of U. S. atomic stockpile, may
serve as a deterrent to war and hence contribute to peace, whereas
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as in the case of atomic power
plants providing electricity or in the case of atomic propelled commercial airplanes, may increase the military potentials of a nation and
hence, may have a tremendous wartime significance. Similarly, it
may be very hard to determine the line where peaceful research and
studies end or shade off into their military counterparts. Also, it may
be difficult to distinguish to what extent is the experience obtained
through an Agency project utilized in a country that has an atomic
development program of its own.' 3 1
Ultimately, of course, the success of the IAEA will depend on
the decisions made by its members through the governing Board and
the General Conference. These, in turn, will depend on the costs the
members may want to bear, as well as on the general international
climate, and the members' willingness to cooperate. But even if there
is such cooperation, it is not to be expected in the near future that
the Agency will be in a position to relieve man of the necessity to
earn his daily living or to serve as a magic panacea for the troubles
of the world. Undoubtedly, great tasks lie ahead of the natural and
social engineers of our time as well as those of future generations before the benefits of harnessing nuclear energy can be made available
beyond the present modest beginnings to the world at large so that
man will no longer be a slave to his environment.
231 A Ifrench-sponsored amendment to define the military or non-peaceful uses of
atomic energy as the "military applications of the atomic explosion and the toxicity of
radioactive products" was subsequently withdrawn.
See docs. IAEA/CS/Art.
XX/Amend. 1; IAEA/CS/OR. 38, pp. 79-80.

